Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights? by Reidenberg, Joel R.
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
1992
Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or
Frontier for Individual Rights?
Joel Reidenberg
Fordham University School of Law, jreidenberg@law.fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joel Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 Fed. Comm. L. J. 195 (1992)
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/800
Privacy in the Information Economy:





I. THE WILDERNESS-PRIVACY CONCERNS IN THE
INFORMATION ECONOMY AND THE FRAMEWORK
FOR LEGAL PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS ......... 200
A. Privacy Concerns .............................. 201
B. The Existing Framework for Privacy Rights .... 208
II. SECTORAL FORTRESSES-FEDERAL RIGHTS OF
INFORMATION PRIVACY? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
A. The Ramparts of Protection .................... 210
1. Privacy and Finance ....................... 210
2. P'ivacy and Telecommunications .......... 214
3. Privacy and Education. ................ 216
4. Privacy and the Workplace ................ 217
5. Privacy and Home Entertainment .......... 217
B. The Wild Frontier ............................. 219
III. TAMING THE FRONTIER-STATE RIGHTS OF
INFORMATION PRIVACY? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
A. Common Law Privacy Rights .................. 221
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. A.B.
Dartmouth 1983; J.D. Columbia 1986; D.E.A. dr. int'l eco. Universite de Paris I
(Pantheon-Sorbonne) 1987. I would like to thank Stewart Dresner and the partici-
pants in the Privacy Laws & Business 4th Annual Data Protection Conference at Cam-
bridge University for the opportunity to present and discuss earlier sections of this
article. I am also particularly grateful to Jeffrey P. Cunard, Carl Felsenfeld, Michael
M. Martin, Michael P. Malloy, Russell G. Pearce and Steve Thel for their helpful
comments on prior drafts. A Fordham University Faculty Research Grant Award
supported work on this Article and Jeffrey Ash, Peter Batacan, Lawrence Schneider
and Rori Wender ably provided research assistance.
196 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol.44
1. Intrusion upon Seclusion .................. 222
2. Public Disclosure of Private Facts ......... 223
3. False Light Publicity ...................... 224
4. Misappropriation of an Individual's Name. 225
B. Statutory Protection ............... 227
1. Personal Information and Financial
Services .................................... 229
2. Personal Information and
Telecommunications
Services .................................... 231
3. Personal Information and Home
Entertainment and Information Services ... 232
4. Personal Information and Employment
Records ................................... 232
5. Personal Information and Insurance
R ecords ................................... 233
6. Personal Information and Special
Protections ................................ 234
C. The Open Range of Unsatisfied Concerns ....... 234
IV. A MISSION FOR THE CAVALRY-FRAMING THE
DEBATE FOR INTELLIGENT INFORMATION PRIVACY
PROTECTION ....................................... 236
V. CONCLUSION ....................................... 243
INTRODUCTION
More than twenty years ago, American legal scholars first
considered the impact of computerization on privacy.' Several
years later, the United States Privacy Protection Study Commis-
sion, under a congressional mandate, made an extensive study of
privacy rights in the emerging information society.2 The Com-
mission focused on eight sets of record-keeping relationships3
and found that privacy was not protected satisfactorily from
1. See Arthur R. Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of
a New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1089 (1969).
2. See U.S. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN
INFORMATION SOCIETY (1977) [hereinafter PRIVACY COMM'N].
3. The Commission addressed: (1) the consumer-credit relationship; (2) the de-
positary relationship; (3) mailing lists; (4) the insurance relationship; (5) the employ-
ment relationship; (6) record-keeping in the medical care relationship; (7)
investigative reporting agencies; and (8) record-keeping in the education relationship.
PRIVACY COMM'N, supra note 2, at xiii.
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either government or industry intrusions.4 In the fourteen years
following the Commission's study, the actual emergence of an
information economy has generated little scholarly analysis of
the overall legal framework in the United States for privacy and
information processing activities by the business community.
During the 1980s, the dramatic advances in telecommuni-
cations and information technology changed the relationship be-
tween individuals and corporations with respect to the
circulation of personal information.6 Information technology
and networking significantly enhanced the extent of available
personal information and eliminated inefficient record-keeping
practices that once kept personal information from public scru-
tiny.7 The proliferation of computers in the last decade has en-
couraged extensive gathering and dissemination of personal
information through sophisticated data collection techniques, 8
4. See PRIVACY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 1-35.
5. Many insightful studies have analyzed rights of privacy and state action in
connection with computer-processed personal information. See, e.g., DAVID H.
FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES: THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
(1989). General surveys of privacy rights in the context of computers have been writ-
ten. See, eg., WARREN FREEDMAN, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN THE COMPUTER
AGE (1987); RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 11
12.09-12.13 (1985). See Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 707 (1987) (focusing generally on privacy rights without delineat-
ing clearly between the public and private sectors). Recent articles address discrete
privacy issues. See, e.g., Robert M. Gelman, Prescribing Privacy. The Uncertain Role
of the Physician in the Protection of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C. L. REV. 255 (1984)
(health information); Robert Kastenmaier et. al., Communications Privacy: A Legisla-
tive Perspective, 1989 WIs. L. REV. 715 (1989) (telecommunications issues); Ben A.
Rich, The Assault on Privacy in Healthcare Decision Making, 68 DENV. U.L. REV. 1
(1991) (health information); Glen Chatmas Smith, We've Got Your Number! (Is It
Constitutional to Give It Out?) Caller Identification Technology and the Right to Infor-
mational Privacy, 37 UCLA L. REV. 145 (1989) (telecommunications and caller iden-
tification). Several student notes have addressed particular aspects of private sector
rights. See Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dis-
semination of Personal Information, 65 TEx. L. REV. 1395 (1987) [hereinafter Gra-
ham]; John A. McLaughlin, Note, Intrusion upon Informational Seclusion in the
Computer Age, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 831 (1984).
6. Personal information refers to information about identified or identifiable
individuals.
7. See Oscar H. Gandy, The Surveillance Society: Information Technology and
Bureaucratic Social Control, 39 J. COMM. 61, 62-63 (1989).
8. See, e.g., David Churbuck, Computers'New Frontier, FORBES, Nov. 26, 1990,
at 257, 260 (describing how Northwest Airlines collects ticket receipts and stores them
on laser disks for future image processing).
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corporate outsourcing of data processing,9 and the establishment
of information service providers and clearinghouses.10 Intercon-
nected computing systems and expanding information process-
ing capabilities have led to rapidly diminished responsibility and
accountability for the treatment of personal information; fewer
and fewer direct contacts exist between individuals and those
holding personal information.1 Vast quantities of personal in-
formation containing greater detail than ever before about an in-
dividual's financial status, health status, activities and personal
associations are now readily available through commercial infor-
mation services and list brokers. 12
These new capabilities and the increased circulation of per-
sonal information in the private sector raise significant privacy
issues. A 1990 poll taken in the United States by Equifax, one of
the major national credit reporting agencies, found that seventy-
nine percent of Americans are concerned about privacy and the
use of personal information. 13 Americans believe that they have
9. See Allen R. Grogan & Ron Ben-Yehuda, Outsourcing Data Processing Opera-
tions, 8 COMPUTER LAW. 1 (Dec. 1991) (assessing risks and benefits of outsourcing
arrangements); George Brandon & John K. Halvey, The Outsourcing Decision: Avoid-
ing Pitfalls, AM. BANKER, Jan. 15, 1992, at 4, 4-5 (describing corporate outsourcing
arrangement).
10. See Norman Jonas, The Hollow Corporation, Bus. WK., Mar. 3, 1986, at 56,
56-71 (describing new corporate networking strategies); John Markoff, Business Tech-
nology: For Shakespeare, Just Log On, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1991, at D1 (describing
new data exchange networks).
11. See, e.g., Gandy, supra note 7, at 63-64; John W. Verity, Rethinking the Com-
puter, Bus. WK., Nov. 26, 1990, at 116, 116-24 (describing the developments in corpo-
rate computer networks).
12. See infra notes 29-35. Over the last decade, the ability of the private sector to
accumulate, use and sell personal information has increased dramatically. The name-
trading business is now estimated to be a $3 billion industry. See Jill Smolowe, Read
Thislllll, TIME, Nov. 26, 1990, at 62, 66. Today, from home or office, a laptop com-
puter can be connected to telecommunications networks that provide instant access to
databases containing substantial quantities of personal information. Information ser-
vice networks such as Dialog, Prodigy or CompuServe provide access to tremendous
database resources that can include information ranging from resumes of job hunters
to bill collection address lists. See Claudia H. Deutsch, Headhunting from a Data
Base, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1990, at C25; William M. Bilkely, Bill Collectors Master
Automated Arm-Twisting, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1990, at B1; Jeffrey Rothfeder, Is
Nothing Private?, Bus. WK., Sept. 4, 1989, at 74, 74-82.
13. Louis HARRIS Assocs. & ALAN F. WESTIN, EQUIFAX, INC., THE EQUIFAX
REPORT ON CONSUMERS IN THE INFORMATION AGE, at V (1990) [hereinafter
EQUIFAX REPORT]. In addition, several highly publicized incidents during the last
year have brought greater attention to privacy issues. These incidents include the
abandoned release of a Lotus/Equifax consumer profile database on CD-ROM, the
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lost control over personal information. 14  Not surprisingly, pri-
vacy and information processing have also generated substantial
interest abroad. In many European countries including Austria,
France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and the United King-
dom, broad statutes provide a general set of privacy rights appli-
cable to the private sector.15 Recently, a number of foreign
governments have even prohibited the transmission of personal
information to countries perceived as ignoring computer privacy
concerns. 16
The thesis of this Article is that the American legal system
responds incoherently and incompletely to the privacy issues
raised by existing information processing activities in the busi-
ness community.' 7 Part I examines key privacy concerns and
the federal and state framework for the legal protection of indi-
vidual rights. Part II demonstrates that the rights available at
the federal level address limited privacy concerns and then in
monitoring of electronic mail on the Prodigy information service, regional telephone
company proposals to offer caller identification features, and electronic surveillance of
employee activities.
14. Seventy-one percent of Americans believe they have lost control over the use
and dissemination of personal information and seventy-nine percent believe that pri-
vacy is a fundamental right. EQUIFAX REPORT, supra note 13, at 7, 11.
15. See ADRIANA C.M. NUGTER, TRANSBORDER FLOW OF PERSONAL DATA
WITHIN THE EC (1990); A.C. Evans, European Data Protection Laws, 29 AM. J.
COMp. L. 578 (1981); Data Protection Roundup, PRIVACY L. & Bus., July 1991, at 2-
7. A recent draft directive on data protection issued on September 13, 1990 by the
Commission of the European Communities has also increased attention to privacy
protection. See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protec-
tion of Individuals in Relation to the Processing of Personal Data, 1990 O.J. (C277),
Com(90)314 Final SYN 287 (Sept. 13, 1990) [hereinafter Draft EC Directive].
16. Because of privacy concerns, Norway, Austria, Germany, and Sweden have
each imposed restrictions on international data flows. Commission nationale de
rinformatique et des libert~s, l0e Rapport au President de la R6publique et au Parle-
ment, Annexe 9, at 308-09 (1989). France has restricted the transfer of personal infor-
mation to Italy on privacy grounds. Id. at 32-34 (reprinting Deliberation No. 89-78
du 11 juillet 1989 relative A la transmission d'informations relatives aux cadres super-
ieurs de la Soci&t6 Fiat France i la Soci6t6 Fiat i Turin). France has also prohibited
data exports to Belgium, Switzerland and the United States. Interview with Ariane
Mole, Attach6e Relations Internationales, Direction Juridique, Commission nationale
de l'informatique et des libert~s, in Paris, France (June 6, 1991). The United King-
dom has also blocked a data transfer to the United States. See SEVENTH REPORT OF
THE DATA PROTECTION REGISTRAR, at 33-34 (1991); First UK Ban on Data Exports
is to Named Companies in the USA, PRIVACY L. & Bus., at 5 (Winter, 1990/91).
17. This article will not address any issues raised by government information
processing or government attempts to gain access to information about individuals
held in the private sector.
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only a few situations. Part III shows that at the state level
neither the available common law rights nor the statutory pro-
tections apply to the full scope of relevant privacy concerns.
Part IV offers suggestions based on comparisons with European
legislation for the development of a new legal framework to co-
herently and completely satisfy privacy concerns for information
processing by the business community.
I. THE WILDERNESS-PRIVACY CONCERNS IN THE
INFORMATION ECONOMY AND THE FRAMEWORK
FOR LEGAL PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS
Over a century ago, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, in
one of the most influential legal articles in American history,
referred to privacy in the United States as the "right to be let
alone."18 This view reflected, in part, the tradition of individual-
ism in the United States and Warren's wrath at journalistic prac-
tices in Boston at the time.19 Almost one hundred years later,
privacy principles applicable to computer processing of personal
information were widely recognized around the world as a ne-
cessity for an information-based economy.20 Two important
18. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 205 (1890). Others have cast the philosophical basis for privacy some-
what differently. See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (arguing
that the privacy right consists of the complete control by an individual to determine
the disclosure of personal information to others); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an
Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964)
(reasoning that privacy concerns fundamental human dignity); Charles Fried, Privacy,
77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968) (taking the position that privacy consists of the right of
individuals to define themselves for others); Miller, supra note 1, at 1107-08 (arguing
that privacy entails the control of the flow of information about individuals); Richard
A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978) (arguing that privacy has
an economic basis).
19. The impetus for this famous article was thought to be Warren's fury at tabloid
press reports of his daughter's wedding. William Prosser, The Right of Privacy, 48
CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). See also SAMUEL HOFSTADTER & GEORGE HOROWITZ,
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 17 (1964). Other scholars have speculated that Warren was
angered by gossip column reports of his family's social life. See Diane Zimmerman,
Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren's and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 291, 295-96 (1983).
20. See Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development, Recommenda-
tions of Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 1981 I.L.M. 422, O.E.C.D. Doe. No. C(80)58
final [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]; Convention for the Protection of Individuals
with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 1981 I.L.M. 377, Euro. T.S.
No. 108 (Jan. 28, 1981) [hereinafter European Convention].
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international organizations, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (O.E.C.D.) and the Council of Eu-
rope, each established principles for information processing in
the private sector.21 These principles address the full range of
data processing activities-namely, the acquisition, use, storage,
transmission and dissemination of personal information.22
Many foreign countries have adopted legislation comprehen-
sively regulating information processing.23 In the United States,
however, no single source of privacy rights covers each data
processing activity. Information privacy rights emerge from a
complex web of federal and state laws that have responded to
narrowly identified problems, while industry practices afford
some additional non-legal protection.
A. Privacy Concerns
In the context of data processing activities by the business
community, the term "privacy" encompasses concerns about
fair and reasonable information practices as well as confidential-
ity.24 A range of obvious and subtle issues arise from each data
processing activity.
21. Id. The OECD Guidelines, supra note 20, seek voluntary compliance, while
the European Convention, supra note 20, has the force of an international treaty.
22. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 20, art. 7-14; European Convention, supra
note 20, art. 5-11.
23. See supra note 15. These statutes generally follow the Council of Europe con-
vention on data processing. See European Convention, supra note 20. The European
Convention sets forth standards for the protection of personal information that must
be enacted into national law by signatory countries. The European Convention ad-
dresses data collection and requires that personal information be "obtained and
processed fairly and lawfully." Id. art. 5a. Personal information may only be stored
for specified and legitimate purposes. Id. art. 5b. Stored information may not be used
for purposes incompatible with those relating to the data collection. Id. art. 5b. Per-
sonal information that is not needed to serve the purpose of collection may not be
gathered or stored. Id. art. 5c. Personal information may not be stored longer than is
necessary to accomplish the purpose of collection. Id. art. 5e. Personal information
must be accurate and current. Id. art. 5d. Individuals must be able to determine the
existence of and gain access to any database containing their personal information. Id.
art. 8a-b. Individuals also must have a right to correct erroneous personal informa-
tion and must have a right to erase personal information that by its processing would
contravene any of the basic principles. Id. art. 8c. The European Convention further
prohibits the processing of information revealing racial origin, political opinions, reli-
gious or other beliefs, as well as information concerning health, sexual life, or criminal
convictions unless special domestic law safeguards are adopted. Id. art. 6.
24. See PRIVACY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 14-21, 501 (elaborating on fair infor-
mation practices).
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Privacy often conjures up fears of "Peeping Toms," com-
puter hackers, and unauthorized disclosures of personal infor-
mation to third parties.25 Yet, in the case of data processing,
there are obvious concerns about the information- acquisition it-
self. As with the fear of Peeping Toms, individuals desire notice
of the collection of personal information by others and the op-
portunity to consent to the acquisition of such information.26
Many organizations gather personal information in rather visible
ways with the consent of individuals.27 However, many individ-
uals are unaware of the myriad of organizations that collect per-
sonal information for commercial purposes. These unknown
groups and surreptitiously gathered collections of personal infor-
mation are troubling.28 Directories exist listing thousands of
rental mailing lists available from different companies.29 Largely
unbeknown to the general public, information service compa-
nies, for example, collect and disseminate information regarding
personal health,30 insurance claims,31 and driving records.
32
Computer reservation systems process and retain information re-
25. See Miller, supra note 1, at 1109-14.
26. See, e.g., OECD Guidelines, supra note 20, art. 7; European Convention,
supra note 20, arts. 5a, 8a; Public and Corporate Reactions to Privacy: Hearings on
Domestic and International Data Protection Issues Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Info.,
Justice and Agric. of the House Gov't Operations Comm., 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1991) [hereinafter Hearings I] (statement of Professor David Linowes).
27. Credit card holders, for example, know that card issuers necessarily maintain
records identifying both the purchases that are made and the particular selling
merchant. The Fair Credit Billing Act requires card issuers to provide cardholders
with a statement of account. 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a) (1988). See also Agreement Between
Cardmember and American Express Travel Related Services Co., CD 22024 (Revised
Nov. 1989) (obligating cardholders to pay amount stated on monthly statement);
American Express Cardholder Summary of Account (showing details of monthly
transactions). Telephone users see that telecommunications companies process data
identifying the time, place of origin, destination, number called, duration and amount
charged for each call. See, e.g., Standard MCI Telecommunications Customer Ac-
count Invoice. Credit applications routinely ask for detailed information regarding
the applicant's financial history and employment status and request the applicant to
authorize an investigation and the release of credit reports. See 15 U.S.C. § 168lb(3).
28. See Marc Rotenberg, In Support of a Data Protection Board in the United
States, 8 GOV'T INFO. Q. 79, 83-84 (1991).
29. Smolowe, supra note 12, at 66 (referring to STANDARD RATE & DATA SER-
VICE, DIRECT MAIL LIST RATES AND DATA, which contains descriptions of over
10,000 commercially available lists).
30. See Data Protection, Computers, and Changing Information Practices: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. of Gov't Information, Justice and Agric. of the House Comm.
on Gov't Operations, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 11 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings II] (state-
ment of Marc Rotenberg et al., of the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibil-
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lating to individual's travel plans, ticket charges (including
credit card information), telephone numbers, hotel reservations,
and rental car arrangements.33 Supermarkets in various parts of
the country have, through frequent shopper programs, enabled
one of the country's largest financial institutions to keep detailed
records of individual customer's buying patterns for sale to
product manufacturers.34 Other information service providers
make databases available that identify all the alumni of various
universities.35
While the unknown collection of personal information may
be troubling, the unnecessary or excessive acquisition of personal
information from individuals is also a privacy concern. 6 Ninety
percent of Americans think the collection of excessive personal
information is a problem. Often, information may be gathered
"because it's there." If an individual has no understanding of
the extraneous character of personal information or no opportu-
nity to refuse to disclose such information, personal information
may be collected and disseminated when an informed individual
ity); Anne McGrath, The Executive Goldfish Bowl, FORBES, Feb. 11, 1985, at 154;
Gerald Odening, Protecting Medical Records, FORBES, Dec. 8, 1980, at 165.
31. For example, two southern companies, Employee Information Services in
Louisiana and Industrial Foundation of America in Texas, maintain computer
databases of employee personal injury claims. Hearings II, supra note 30, at 6 (state-
ment of David Czernick, Exec. Dir., Louisiana Consumers League). See also David
Tuller, Trying to Avoid an Insurance Debacle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1987, at Cl. The
Medical Information Bureau (MIB, Inc.) in Massachusetts even compiles records on
life insurance applications and applicants. See MIB, INC., A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO
THE MEDICAL INFORMATION BUREAU (1991).
32. Jeffrey Rothfeder, Looking For A Job? You May Be Out Before You Go In,
Bus. WK., Sept. 24, 1990, at 128.
33. Howard Gold, Sabre Dancing, FORBES, Dec. 30, 1985, at 88. The Sabre air-
line reservation system also includes the entry of home and travel telephone contacts.
Travel agencies, airlines, and rental car companies are even fighting over the owner-
ship of this compiled information. Hearings II, supra note 30, at 2 (statement of Rep.
Bob Wise).
34. Hearings II, supra note 30, at 94-95 (statement of Jerry Saltzgaber, C.E.O.,
Citicorp Point of Sale Information Services); Lena H. Sun, Checking Out the Cus-
tomer's Habits, WASH. POST, July 9, 1989, at HI.
35. For example, University Pronet is an electronic database located at Stanford
University that contains lists of graduates from several universities. See Claudia H.
Deutsch, Headhuntingfrom a Data Base, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1990, at C25.
36. See, e.g., OECD Guidelines, supra note 20, art. 8; European Convention,
supra note 20, art. 5c.
37. EQUIFAX REPORT, supra note 13, at 18. Fifty-seven percent of Americans
believe consumers are asked to reveal excessive amounts of personal information. Id.
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might have refused to make such disclosures .3  Not surpris-
ingly, executives in industries that amass personal information
are particularly sensitive to this concern in their own lives and
decline to provide unnecessary personal information in many
situations. 9
Another important concern arising from the collection of
personal information is accuracy.4° Errors may arise from inac-
curate collection or recording techniques. Similarly, misleading
information may arise from incomplete collections of personal
information. Individuals will, therefore, desire access to per-
sonal information and the right to have errors or misleading in-
formation corrected.41
A more subtle concern relates to the uses or collection pur-
poses of gathered personal information.42 Information disclosed
38. For example, MCI offers a discount to its subscribers for frequently called
numbers. To obtain this discount, a subscriber must provide MCI with the name of
the person being called and the family relationship. While such personal information
is irrelevant for the purposes of the volume discount, MCI does not inform subscribers
of the uses that will be made of this information. See Letter from MCI, Inc. to the
author (Mar. 25, 1991) (in which MCI misleadingly implies that the name of the
person called is needed to determine if the individual is an MCI subscriber and makes
no mention of the reasons for collecting information about family relationships). Sim-
ilarly, as part of the bicentennial celebration of the U.S. Constitution, Philip Morris
offered to send a free copy of the Bill of Rights to anyone who called a toll-free
number. Phillip Morris requested callers to identify their telephone numbers so that
the company could search other databases for demographic and lifestyle information
about the callers. The telephone number was wholly irrelevant for the purpose of
mailing a document. See Mary J. Culnan, Bill of Rights? Or Bill of Goods?, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 1990, at E21.
39. See EQUIFAX REPORT, supra note 13, at 16 (noting that, compared to the
general public, a significantly greater percentage of information industry leaders refuse
to reveal personal information on various application forms).
40. See, e.g., OECD Guidelines, supra note 20, art. 8; European Convention,
supra note 20, art. 5d; Miller, supra note 1, at 1114-19.
41. See, e.g., OECD Guidelines, supra note 20, art. 12-13; European Convention,
supra note 20, art. 8c.
42. See, e.g., OECD Guidelines, supra note 20, art. 9-10; European Convention,
supra note 20, art. 5b. Advances in merge and sort computer software programming
coupled with more accessible computing systems make it possible to compile, from
previously incompatible sources, astoundingly detailed profiles of individuals, their
lives and lifestyles. For example, a software product, MarketPulse, enables businesses
to manipulate lists on an IBM mainframe. Random House is testing a database that
enables it to send specialized mail order catalogs to customers with specific reading
preferences. Other publishers are able to tailor "demographic editions" of books to fit
customer interests. David Churbuck, Smart Mail, FORBES, Jan. 22, 1990, at 107.
TRW, a credit reporting service, has developed a database, Financial Lifestyle
Database, and will sell to anyone the name, address, and phone number of individuals
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or collected for one purpose may easily have an associated use in
an entirely different and undesirable context.43 Without knowl-
edge of these associated uses or consent to them, individuals may
be outraged to discover how much of their lives are exposed to
others.44 It is probably not commonly known that credit card
companies develop lifestyle profiles of card holders, that tele-
communications companies track users' calling patterns, 45 that
product manufacturers track the habits of individual custom-
ers, 46 and that credit reporting agencies also assemble data on
household composition (such as marital status of occupants)
and on legal disputes involving individuals.47 Point of sale tech-
nology with bar code systems for pricing and inventory manage-
grouped by income level, credit cardholdings and credit lines. Rothfeder, supra note
12, at 81.
43. The debate over telephone caller identification services illustrates this prob-
lem. The caller identification service represents a situation in which a telephone
number used in connection with call routing is made to function for another purpose,
namely identifying the caller to the recipient and matching callers to other personal
information. See Smith, supra note 5, at 150; PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY TASK
FORCE, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY TASK FORCE SUBMIT-
TED TO SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY 14 (May 28, 1991). The technology offers the
possibility for a caller to block the disclosure of the phone number. The real issue in
the debate should be the allocation of the costs for each component of the service. See
also PRIVACY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 20-21 (arguing that individuals must have
legally enforceable rights of confidentiality to prevent information gathered for one
purpose from being disclosed for another unrelated use); Rotenberg, supra note 28, at
81 (arguing that associated uses of personal information breach an implied promise).
44. For example, Lotus, the software developer, and Equifax, the credit reporting
agency, recently compiled a database on a CD-ROM storage disk, "Marketplace:
Households." The database contained information on 120 million U.S. residents. The
information included name, address, marital status, income level, and shopping pref-
erences and was to be sold throughout the U.S. last year. John R. Wilke, Lotus Prod-
uct Spurs Fears about Privacy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1990, at BI, B5. The product
was withheld from the market because of objections from consumer groups. Law-
rence M. Fisher, New Data Base Ended by Lotus and Equifax, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 24,
1991, at D4. See also EQUIFAX REPORT, supra note 13, at 69 (noting that 86% of
Americans are concerned about the sale of lists containing information regarding per-
sonal characteristics).
45. See Rothfeder, supra note 12, at 76 (citing examples that shows telemarketing
companies have access to information about the places that individuals call); Eben
Shapiro, MCI Discounts Expected on Numbers Called Often, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
1991, at D4 (MCI billing system will enable MCI to offer discounts to residential
customers for a high number of calls to specific telephone numbers).
46. See Churbuck, supra note 42, at 107 (noting that Kraft General Foods keeps
names and addresses of people who redeem newspaper coupons and call toll-free mar-
keting numbers).
47. Rothfeder, supra note 12, at 80.
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ment and coded check authorization cards also enable
supermarkets to monitor customer purchases and match
purchases of any intimate item with individual customers. 8
Even less public attention has been paid to the particularly
troubling associated uses of personal information that can result
from combinations of data from various existing sources. For
example, the recently announced billing arrangements between
credit card companies and telecommunications carriers now en-
able the centralization of substantial amounts of potentially sen-
sitive data that could be sorted to identify and track the
associations, personal preferences, travels, activities and, in some
instances, even the political beliefs of individuals.4 9 If individu-
als knew that such activities would or could take place, they
might not disclose some personal information or enter into vari-
ous transactions.50
Finally, the duration of storage of personal information
raises additional concerns.51 Information may be stored beyond
the lifecycle of the purpose for which it was collected. Retention
beyond such a time suggests that other uses of the personal in-
formation are contemplated. In addition, as the personal infor-
mation ages, it may become obsolete or inaccurate.
The industry traditionally views these privacy issues as not
being problematic until specific abuses occur.52 The business
community desires minimal restraints on the flow of personal
48. See Sun, supra note 34 at H4 (describing how Vons and Citicorp began a pilot
test of this kind).
49. AT&T is now a successful issuer of Visa and MasterCard brand credit cards,
and American Express offers billing services for telephone calls placed through MCI.
Keith Bradsher, AT&TStrained by a Success, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1990, at D1. The
centralized transaction records from these services may reveal tremendously detailed
profiles of an individual's life, from the book titles purchased on the credit card reflect-
ing, for example, the individual's political preferences to the people with whom the
cardholder associates by telephone.
50. See Hearings I, supra note 26, at 8 (statement of John Baker, Senior Vice
President, Equifax, Inc.); EQUIFAX REPORT, supra note 13, at 14-15 (1990) (indicat-
ing that a significant percentage of polled individuals revealed that they have not ap-
plied for jobs, credit or insurance because they did not want to provide certain
personal information).
51. See, e.g., OECD Guidelines, supra note 20, art. 8; European Convention,
supra note 20, art. 5e.
52. See Hearings I, supra note 26, at 15 (statement of John Baker, Senior Vice
President, Equifax); PRIVACY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 34 (noting that industry pre-
ferred acceptance of voluntary codes rather than mandatory rules).
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information to enhance the development of new technological
offerings.5 3 While business recognizes that privacy must be pro-
tected,54 most companies in information-intensive industries do
not have any mechanism to address privacy problems.5 There
is also a disparity between the industry views of privacy issues
and those of the general public. For example, direct marketing
executives believe that it is proper to screen lists of individuals
for income level and credit histories without advance permission
from consumers, yet the vast majority of Americans finds the
practice unacceptable. 6 Many in industry prefer a wait and see
approach to new privacy policies,57 though advocacy groups
think the issues need to be raised presently.5 8 The disparity be-
tween the industry views and the views of most individuals re-
flects the inchoate sense that privacy harms can occur
incrementally by the increased processing of personal informa-
tion without established fair information practices and does not
require a series of singularly offensive abuses to warrant consid-
eration and review of legal protection. In fact, Americans today
are more distrustful of industry than government with respect to
the collection and use of personal information. 9
Because the privacy concerns cover a broad range of issues
addressing notice and consent for the collection of information,
the unnecessary collection of personal information, data accu-
racy and access, associated uses of personal information and the
duration of storage, an invasion of privacy may occur in the con-
text of any one of the data processing activities. The importance
53. The industry notes that consumers want the benefits of the use of their per-
sonal information. See EQUIFAX REPORT, supra note 13, at 26. See also Peter W.
Herman & John K. Halvey, International Flow of Data is Threatened, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 25, 1990, at 12.
54. See, e.g., EQuinAx REPORT, supra note 13, at 77; Hearings II, supra note 30,
at 50-51 (statement of Richard A. Barton, Senior Vice President, Gov't Affairs, Direct
Marketing Association, addressing industry self-regulation).
55. See EQUIFAX REPORT, supra note 13, at 98 (showing that advisory boards
and panels dealing with privacy issues are rare among industry groups).
56. Id. at 70.
57. Most companies prefer to wait until others in their particular industry develop
privacy policies and follow that lead. Substantial minorities of companies would
either pioneer new privacy protection policies, or at the other extreme, wait until laws
are passed before adopting new policies. Id. at 101.
58. See id. at 100 (privacy advocacy groups are overwhelmingly considered im-
portant to expose abuses, bring lawsuits, and sponsor legislation).
59. Id. at VIII.
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of these concerns to individuals suggests that legal protection
should systematically consider each data processing activity.
B. The Existing Framework for Privacy Rights
The American legal system does not contain a comprehen-
sive set of privacy rights or principles that collectively address
the acquisition, storage, transmission, use and disclosure of per-
sonal information within the business community. The federal
constitution does not address privacy for information transac-
tions wholly within the private sector6° and state constitutional
provisions similarly do not afford rights for private transac-
tions.6 1 Instead, legal protection is accorded exclusively through
privacy rights created on an ad hoc basis by federal or state leg-
islation or state common law rules.6 2 In addition, self-regulatory
60. Although the U.S. Constitution does not contain an express right of privacy,
several provisions of the Bill of Rights have been interpreted by the Supreme Court to
provide a sphere of privacy protection to individuals against intrusive government
activities. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965). These constitutional decisions have generally arisen in the context of
the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth
Amendment bar to self-incrimination and requirement of Due Process, and the Four-
teenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court, however, has not
elaborated a constitutional right of privacy among private-sector actors. Although the
First Amendment protections for freedom of speech have been extended to commer-
cial speech, the application of these protections to private information transactions
unrelated to advertising or journalism is beyond the scope of this article. See generally
Miller, supra note 1, at 1162-68 (presenting a preliminary exploration of First Amend-
ment issues and information privacy for computer use).
61. A number of state constitutions expressly protect privacy rights. See, eg.,
ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 8 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his
home invaded, without authority of law."); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All people...
have inalienable rights. Among these are.., obtaining safety, happiness, and pri-
vacy."). ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The people shall have the right to be secure...
against.., invasions of privacy."). These state constitutional provisions are similar to
the federal constitutional rights in that they impose restrictions only on governmental
activities. See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 570 P.2d 1070 (Ariz. 1977); Perkey v. Dep't of
Motor Vehicles, 721 P.2d 50 (Cal. 1986); Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354
(Ill. 1985); Commonwealth v. Kean, 556 A.2d 374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
These constitutional provisions have not yet been applied to purely private activi-
ties. See Gerald B. Cope, Note, Toward a Right of Privacy as a Matter of State Consti-
tutional Law, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. RaV. 631 (1977).
62. Because federal legislative jurisdiction for commercial information processing
activities is drawn principally from the Interstate Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, federal law tends to be adopted on a narrow sectoral basis. State legislation and
common law may have a broader jurisdictional basis. This multilayered approach
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schemes have been adopted by some industries63 and by various
companies.6 Although these schemes may offer privacy pro-
tection, they do not provide enforceable legal rights65 and do not
seem to have permeated the vast majority of information
processing entities.66
In general, the aggregation of the federal and state rights
provides targeted protection for individuals in answer to defined
problems. This mosaic approach derives from the traditional
American fear of government intervention in private activities
and the reluctance to broadly regulate industry. The result of
the mosaic is a rather haphazard and unsatisfactory response to
each of the privacy concerns.
II. SECTORAL FORTRESSES-FEDERAL RIGHTS OF
INFORMATION PRIVACY?
Existing federal legislation only addresses privacy concerns
in particular industry contexts. 67 Although each of these indus-
try-specific laws contains detailed obligations, they provide a
sphere of protection to isolated concerns for narrowly-identified
problems and are incomplete responses to information privacy
illustrates the division of power between the federal government and the state
governments.
63. See, e.g., Hearings II, supra note 30, at 50-51 (statement of Richard A. Bar-
ton, Senior Vice President, Gov't Affairs, Direct Marketing Association).
64. See AMERICAN ExPRESS, THE AMERICAN EXPRESS CONSUMER PRIVACY
PRINCIPLES (1991). American Express and IBM each have internal information
codes of conduct.
65. By definition, voluntary compliance codes offer no legal sanctions for infring-
ig practices.
66. See EQUIFAX REPORT, supra note 13, at XIII (noting that few companies in
information processing industries have internal groups monitoring corporate privacy
practices).
67. There is no omnibus legislation applicable to the business community
although the original proposals for the Privacy Act of 1974 contemplated comprehen-
sive provisions applicable to the private sector. See S. REP. No. 1183, 93rd Cong.,
2nd Sess. 14 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6929. At the time, fears of
intrusion into privacy concentrated on governmental gathering of information. Id. at
6933. See also United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 576 (3rd Cir.
1980) ("Much of the concern [leading up to the Privacy Act of 1974] has been with
governmental accumulation of data .... "). The Privacy Act did not include provi-
sions applicable to the private sector. Privacy Act of 1974 § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)-(q)
(1976). Recently, proposed legislation would have created a federal Data Protection
Board. See H.R. 3669, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 685, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991). The Board would not have regulatory authority, but would be charged with
developing privacy principles and codes for the private sector.
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issues. This ad hoc industry-specific approach leaves many areas
of information processing unaddressed such as direct mail indus-
try activities, personnel record-keeping and electronic employee
surveillance. This section will first examine the protections of
industry-specific laws and then will analyze the gaps.
A. The Ramparts of Protection
Congress has enacted laws applicable to the private sector
with respect to financial services, 8 telecommunication services, 9
education records, 70 the workplace, 71 and home entertainment
services.72 The scope of protection accorded by each of these
industry-specific laws is generally limited. The full range of is-
sues with respect to data processing activities for personal infor-
mation, such as fairness in the collection of data, data
minimization, data accuracy and permissible use of personal in-
formation, are not consistently treated at the federal level.
1. Privacy and Finance
The financial services sector has perhaps the greatest vari-
ety of applicable legislation that does not systematically address
privacy concerns. The laws focus for the most part on invasive
or offensive credit services and the government's ability to access
privately held financial records. The Fair Credit Reporting Act
of 1970 ("FCRA") sets forth rights for individuals and responsi-
bilities for consumer credit reporting agencies73 in connection
with the preparation and dissemination of personal information
in a consumer report bearing on the individual's credit worthi-
ness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputa-
tion, personal characteristics or mode of living.74 The FCRA
restrictions do not apply to the disclosure of such personal infor-
68. See infra notes 73-103 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 122-33 and accompanying text.
73. A "consumer credit reporting agency" is defined by the FCRA as: "[A]ny
person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly
engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing con-
sumer reports to third parties .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (1988).
74. See 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1681-1681t (Law Co-op. 1982 & Supp. 1991).
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mation by organizations other than consumer credit reporting
agencies.75
The FCRA primarily regulates disclosures of personal in-
formation and does not generally address the collection of per-
sonal information.7 The statute avoids the issues of notice and
consent, except in cases of the collection of personal information
during personal interviews.77 The FCRA ignores the acquisition
of unnecessary information. In fact, the expansive categories of
regulated personal information ranging from credit worthiness
to personal characteristics 78 reflect that excessive personal infor-
mation may be collected by credit reporting agencies.79
The accuracy of personal information is, nevertheless,
treated by the FCRA. Credit reporting agencies must follow
reasonable procedures to assure accuracy of personal informa-
tion, though agencies are not held strictly liable for errors.80 The
FCRA also requires that a dispute process be implemented to
investigate and correct errors.8 1 To promote fairness and accu-
racy, individuals have a right to be informed of the contents of
personal information files and of the names of recipients of credit
reports. 82 In practice, however, this right may be extremely diffi-
cult to enforce because there is no requirement that credit re-
porting agencies notify individuals of the existence of fies
containing personal information or of the procedures to learn of
75. See Smith v. First Nat'l Bank, 837 F.2d 1575, 1578 (11th Cir.) (bank disclos-
ing information about bad experience with one customer is not a credit reporting
agency within the meaning of the statute), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 820 (1988).
76. In Saint Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 884 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1989), the
court ruled that personal information collected for credit reporting purposes may only
be used in accordance with FCRA, id. at 885, but did not address limiting the collec-
tions of personal information.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1681d(a)(1) (stating that investigative consumer report involving
data collection through personal interviews may not be procured or prepared without
notice to and consent from the consumer).
78. See id. § 1681a(d).
79. See, eg., Rothfeder, supra, note 12, at 80 (noting that credit reporting agen-
cies collect information on marital status).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). See Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 77-78 (6th Cir.
1982); Colletti v. Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 644 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1981).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i.
82. Id. § 168 1g. Fees for access may be charged. Id. § 168 1j. These fees currently
range from $15 to $20. No fee may be charged if credit was denied on the basis of a
credit report. Id. Curiously, consumer reporting agencies offer subscriptions for rou-
tine notification of inquiries. What Price Privacy?, CONSUMER REP., May 1991, at
356, 358.
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the contents and uses of those files. And, despite these obliga-
tions, recent reports have found that forty-three percent of all
personal information files held by the three major credit report-
ing agencies contain false or misleading information. 83
A credit reporting agency has substantial latitude to dis-
seminate regulated personal information without an individual's
consent. The FCRA generally permits the disclosure of personal
information by a credit reporting agency for statutorily specified
purposes, namely establishing the individual's eligibility for
credit, employment, insurance, or any other legitimate business
need.84 The statutory authority for disclosures related to "legiti-
mate business needs" offers a credit reporting agency broad per-
mission to disseminate personal information. 5 Anyone seeking
to obtain a credit report must certify to the credit reporting
agency that the use of the personal information is permitted by
the FCRA.8 6 Disclosures by a credit reporting agency for other
uses require the written consent of the individual whose data is
involved.8 7 As long as there is a statutorily permitted use or
consensual disclosure of a credit report, a recipient is not re-
stricted from making associated or secondary uses of the per-
sonal information without the individual's consent, including
subsequent disseminations.8 8 If an adverse decision on credit,
83. See What Price Privacy?, CONSUMER REP., May 1991, at 356, 356-60. In one
recent case, due to negligent data gathering, credit reports for all the homeowners in
Norwich, Vermont were marked as high risks. Michael W. Miller, Credit Report
Firms Face Greater Pressure; Ask Norwich, Vt. Why, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1991, at
Al.
84. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1681, 1681b (Law Co-op. 1982 and Supp. 1991). See Hansen
v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that the obtainment of a credit
report to investigate political contributions violates FCRA).
85. Courts seek to interpret this as requiring a direct nexus between a transaction
for a consumer and the business claiming a legitimate need. See Hovater v. Equifax,
Inc., 823 F.2d 413 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987). Yet, if there is an
insufficient business transaction, the courts may find that the report is outside the
jurisdiction of the FCRA. Id.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a). A reporting agency need only have "reason to believe"
that a user has a permissible purpose. See Middlebrooks v. Retail Credit Co., 416 F.
Supp. 1013 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(2). Frequently, individuals will be asked to sign blanket
consent statements authorizing inquiry into credit reporting agency files and disclo-
sures of information for any purpose. These consents rarely identify the credit report-
ing agencies or all the uses to which the personal information will be put.
88. Some courts have, however, indicated that consumer reports should only be
used for statutorily permitted purposes. Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214, 1220 (9th
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insurance or employment is based on a consumer report, the de-
cision-maker must inform the consumer of the use of the report
and identify the source of the report.8 9 The user of a credit re-
port need not inform the consumer of any other adverse decision
based on the report.
Although the FCRA does not generally restrict the scope of
personal information which may be stored or the duration of
storage, it does prohibit the dissemination of certain types of ob-
solete information, such as bankruptcy adjudications more than
ten years prior to the report, suits and judgments older than
seven years, paid tax liens older than seven years, records of ar-
rests and convictions older than seven years and any other ad-
verse information older than seven years.90 A significant
exception, however, provides that even obsolete information
may be disseminated if requested in connection with an employ-
ment application for a position with a salary over $20,000, a
credit transaction over $50,000 or the underwriting of life insur-
ance over $50,000.91 In today's economy, this exception can
broadly permit the use and disclosure of obsolete information. 2
Other legislation affecting credit activities and the treat-
ment of personal information includes the Fair Credit Billing
Act of 1974 which requires that consumers be furnished with
copies of consumer credit transaction records and provides that
consumers have rights of error correction.9 3 Creditors are re-
stricted from disclosing information about delinquent payments
pending error resolution,94 but are not otherwise prohibited from
disclosing transaction records to third parties. The statute al-
Cir. 1978) (stating that use of a credit report for purposes not listed in the FCRA
might constitute a violation of provisions against false pretenses). The secondary use
of personal information contained in a credit report might, however, qualify the user
as a credit reporting agency, thus subjecting this usage to the disclosure restrictions of
the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m. See Fischl v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 708
F.2d 143, 149-50 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the adverse decision need not be based
on derogatory information in the credit report).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a).
91. Id. § 1681c(b).
92. These dollar thresholds were set in 1970; despite inflation they have not been
increased.
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 1666.
94. Id. § 1666a.
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lows consistent state legislation.9 5
Similarly, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act of 1977
limits the disclosures to third parties of a debtor's financial situa-
tion in the context of collection.9 6 The Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Act of 1974 limits the use of data relating to sex, race, color,
religion, national origin, age or marital status for purposes of
unlawful discrimination with respect to the grant of credit. 7
The law does not address the collection or storage of such infor-
mation. This law further requires that individuals be notified of
any reasons for the denial of credit.98 The reasons must be de-
scribed with some specificity.99
Aside from the credit laws, the Electronic Funds Transfer
Act of 1978 ("EFTA") establishes mandatory guidelines for the
relationship between consumers and financial institutions in con-
nection with electronic fund transactions. 100 The EFTA sets
forth detailed requirements for the collection of specified trans-
action data, such as time and place of each transaction, and re-
quires disclosures and the provision of periodic account
statements to consumers.101 The EFTA does not restrict the use
of transaction information; disclosures of transaction informa-
tion may be made to third parties. In addition, the EFTA does
not prevent financial institutions from gathering unnecessary
personal information beyond that required for executing the
electronic transactions and the law contains no restriction on the
duration of storage of transaction records. The EFTA does,
however, consider accuracy issues and obligates financial institu-
tions to establish error-correction procedures. 0 2
2. Privacy and Telecommunications
Industry-specific legislation providing limited privacy pro-
tection also exists at the federal level for telecommunications
services. The Communications Act of 1984 and the Electronic
95. Id. § 1666j.
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b(2), 1692c(b).
97. Id. § 1691(a)(1).
98. Id. § 1691(d)(2).
99. Fischl v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 708 F.2d 143, 147-48 (5th Cir.
1983).
100. See 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1693-1693r (Law Co-op. 1982 & Supp. 1991).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1693d.
102. Id. § 1693f
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Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) impose criminal
sanctions on wiretapping and surveillance activities.113 These
laws seek to protect the confidentiality of communications and
generally prohibit the interception of the contents of private
communications. They are primarily targeted against govern-
ment actions. In the event of violations of the ECPA by the
government or private parties, an aggrieved individual may seek
civil penalties.' 4
Under the ECPA, the contents of a private communication
can usually be disclosed by the communications carrier only if
one party consents.10 5 The contents of stored messages, such as
electronic mail, may similarly be disclosed only with the consent
of one of the parties.10 6 These provisions effectively require no-
tice and consent for the collection of the contents of communica-
tions. The statutory definitions of "contents" do not, however,
include data identifying details of telecommunications transac-
tions such as telephone numbers, or time, place, and duration of
call.10 7 In fact, Congress removed language from the Communi-
cations Act protecting information about the identities of parties
to the communication and the existence of the communica-
tion. 0 8 An electronic communication service provider is even
expressly permitted, without notice or subscriber consent, to dis-
close transaction information concerning the subscriber to any
person for any purpose. 10 9 Thus, the ECPA does not set forth
guidelines for the collection of transaction data nor does it limit
the uses of transaction data. Under federal law, the use by pri-
vate parties of pen registers to record outgoing call information
and trap and trace devices to record incoming call data is even
103. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, 2701-2709 (1988).
104. Id. §§ 2520, 2707.
105. Id. § 2511(3)(b). The theory was that a communication is not confidential if
one party is willing to disclose the contents. See Lewellen v. Raff, 843 F.2d 1103,
1115 (8th Cir. 1988). See also Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.) (holding
that spouse may even consent to surreptitious recording of other spouse's telephone
conversations), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974). Contra Kempf v. Kempf, 868 F.2d
970 (8th Cir. 1989).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b). Disclosures without consent may also be made to the
extent that they are necessary for the business of the service provider. Id.
107. Id. § 2510(8).
108. See The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
§ 1, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A). This authorization, however, does not permit dis-
closure to government agents.
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permitted. 110 Companies are increasingly using such technology
to collect information on consumers without their knowledge.I1 1
There are no limitations on the storage of personal information
that is legitimately gathered. The ECPA provides separate crim-
inal penalties for the unauthorized access to transaction records
and stored electronic communications, such as electronic mail,
by anyone other than the service provider, subscriber or commu-
nications addressee.1 12
3. Privacy and Education
Educational institutions receiving public funds must protect
student records in certain limited ways. The Family Education
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 generally prohibits the disclo-
sure of student records to third parties without prior written
consent.1 1 3 The law does not restrict the kind of information
that schools may gather or the sources for such information, nor
does it limit the duration of storage of personal information con-
tained in student files. The law requires, however, that educa-
tional institutions provide students or parents of students with
access to certain school records, yet there is no private right of
action for a former student to compel access. 1 4 In some circum-
stances, this access may be waived in writing. 1 5 Schools must
provide a procedure for students or parents to challenge the ac-
curacy of records and correct or delete misleading or inappropri-
ate data. 1 6
110. Id. § 2511(2)(h). See also United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159,
166 (1977) ("Both the language of the statute and the legislative history establish be-
yond any doubt that pen registers are not governed by Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970 ed. and Supp.
v))"I).
111. See Churbuck, supra note 42, at 107; Clifford J. Levy, Help Lines: The Bene-
fits Are Mutual, N.Y. TIMEs, May 14, 1991, at D4; PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY
TASK FORCE, supra note 42, at 13-14.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
113. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (1988). The statute does not bar the dissemination of
student records if obtained from non-school sources. Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp.
1043, 1050 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). Failure to comply with the Act can result only in a
cutoff of federal funds. See Student Bar Ass'n Bd. of Governors v. Byrd, 239 S.E.2d
415 (N.C. 1977).
114. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A); Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267 (8th
Cir. 1977).
115. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(C).
116. Id. § 1232g(a)(2).
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4. Privacy and the Workplace
In the field of labor relations, there is little federal protec-
tion that addresses privacy concerns. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Act prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of an individual's race, color, sex, religion or national ori-
gin, and, thus, the use or classification of information relating to
these personal characteristics for purposes of unlawful discrimi-
nation would be prohibited.1 7 These civil rights provisions do
not prohibit the collection, storage or treatment of such informa-
tion; the act only imposes sanctions on the use of this personal
information for illegal, discriminatory purposes.118
One federal statute, the Employee Polygraph Protection
Act of 1988,119 restricts the collection of information by private
sector employers through the use of lie detectors. Although this
law addresses data collection, it applies only to the use of a par-
ticular technique for the gathering of personal information and
not to the type or extent of personal information being gathered.
No other federal labor laws address the existing range of other
data processing concerns. In fact, recent cases involving elec-
tronic surveillance of employee job performance have been quite
controversial and have highlighted both the growing sensitivity
to privacy concerns and the extremely limited nature of these
industry-specific rights.1 20
5. Privacy and Home Entertainment
Finally, two laws apply to the home entertainment in-
dustry, particularly cable communication subscription services
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988). Any legislative action following the current
debate over the renewal of civil rights legislation may affect these provisions. How-
ever, the civil rights proposals do not contemplate specific provisions targeting infor-
mation privacy.
118. Cf. Fair Housing Act, § 5, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3605 (precluding the use of
personal information for unlawful discrimination in real estate sales or leasing).
119. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988).
120. See Paul Katzeff, Surveillance Legislation Pending, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 15, 1991,
at 1. See also David F. Linowes & Ray C. Spencer, Privacy: The Workplace Issue of
the '90s, 23 J. MARSHALL L. Rnv. 591 (1990) (describing privacy issues arising in the
workplace); John Lund, Computerized Work Performance Monitoring and Production
Standards: A Review of Labor Law Issues, 1991 LAB. L.J. 195 (discussing computer-
ized monitoring of employees); Note, Addressing New Hazards of the High Technology
Workplace, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1898 (1991) (arguing that there are no effective pri-
vacy rights for employees with respect to surveillance).
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and video rental services. These laws focus largely on the disclo-
sure of customer viewing habits. Nevertheless, they provide the
unique examples of statutory treatment for each privacy
concern.
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 establishes
fair practices for the collection of personal information. The act
requires that customers be informed of the collection of any per-
sonal information as well as the purposes for which it is col-
lected, the anticipated disclosures of such information, the
duration of storage, and the procedures for an individual to gain
access to the records. 121 Cable systems may not be used to
gather personal information without prior consent from the sub-
scriber.1 22 The law seeks to accommodate accuracy concerns
and provides for rights of access and correction of personal in-
formation.1 23 Uses of personal information are also regulated;
subscriber information, such as viewing habits, may be disclosed
to third parties only with the subscriber's consent or for a legiti-
mate business activity related to the provision of service.124 A
mailing list of subscribers may, nonetheless, be disseminated if
each subscriber has an opportunity to opt out.12 The law fur-
ther prohibits the retention of personal information longer than
necessary to accomplish the purposes of collection. 126 Statutory
damages are available to aggrieved individuals. 127
The other law, the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988,128
is a criminal law adopted in response to congressional outrage
over a newspaper reporter's ability to obtain the list of films
rented by Judge Robert Bork at the time of his ill-fated nomina-
tion to the Supreme Court. The Act prohibits the disclosure of
titles of particular films rented by any customer, though it allows
the disclosure of customer names and addresses as well as sub-
ject matter interests for direct marketing purposes, provided that
121. 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(1) (1988). See Warner v. American Cablevision of Kansas
City, 699 F. Supp. 851 (D. Kan. 1988).
122. 47 U.S.C. § 551(b)(1).
123. Id. § 551(d).
124. Id. § 551(c)(2). To obtain a valid consent, the cable operator must inform the
subscriber specifically of the intended disclosures. Warner v. American Cablevision,
699 F. Supp. at 856.
125. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(C).
126. Id. § 551(e).
127. Id. § 551(f).
128. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-11 (1988).
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the customer has an opportunity to opt out. The disclosure of
other personally identifiable information can only be made with
the informed, written consent of the individual concerned at the
time the disclosure is sought.129 However, the Act permits dis-
closures of personal information without consent if such disclo-
sures are in the ordinary course of business for the provision of
videotape rental services. 130 This latter exception may prove to
be a major loophole. Nevertheless, the Act limits the duration of
storage of personal information to one year beyond the date the
information is necessary to accomplish the purpose for which it
was collected.13 ' Civil remedies and statutory damages are avail-
able to aggrieved individuals.13 2
B. The Wild Frontier
Rather than provide consistent protection for individuals,
the aggregation of these industry-specific rights of information
privacy reveals that strikingly limited legal protection is avail-
able at the federal level in response to each of the privacy con-
cerns. The statutory rights have been adopted for particular
industries in specific contexts and result in haphazard protection
for the full variety of concerns.
In assessing the privacy rights for financial services, it is
clear that there is no systematic treatment of the existing privacy
concerns. The laws seek to address narrow issues for credit serv-
ices and electronic fund transfers.1 33 In these endeavors, the
laws do not try to address the full range of privacy concerns; the
credit laws ignore serious data collection concerns,134 use con-
cerns 1 35 and storage concerns,136 while the fund transfer law ad-
dresses data accuracy concerns only.137
As in the financial services sector, the legal rights available
129. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(B).
130. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(E).
131. Id. § 2710(e).
132. Id. § 2710(c).
133. See supra notes 73-103 and accompanying text. Cf. 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (1988)
(prohibiting the disclosure of bank account records without consent, but only if the
disclosure will be made to a government agent).
134. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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to protect information privacy for telecommunications services
are quite detailed in the treatment of narrow problems. The
confidentiality of the contents of communications are protected
carefully, 138 but existing privacy concerns for other personal in-
formation related to such communications are generally ig-
nored.1 39 In particular, the failure to address the circulation of
transaction information is a notable omission where such infor-
mation can be matched with additional personal information
from different sources to create troubling uses.140
With respect to education, federal law targets one form of
information use-third party disclosures of personal informa-
tion141 -and touches on access and accuracy concerns. 142 Yet,
information collection practices, other associated uses of school
records, and storage issues are ignored. Similarly, for the work-
place, federal protections address the use of certain types of in-
formation for illegal discriminatory purposes143 and target one
information collection technique.144 The other privacy concerns
have not been considered in the myriad workplace contexts.
Only in the home entertainment sector has a set of rights
been elaborated to deal with each privacy concern for the vari-
ous information processing activities. These rights are limited to
the context of video rental and cable services.
Thus, in none of the federally regulated industries, with the
exception of video rental and cable services, has data collection,
use, storage and dissemination been systematically addressed.
Many industries have been entirely left alone, such as list bro-
kers and direct marketers, 145 and significant privacy concerns
might only be addressed at the state level.
138. See supra notes 104-08.
139. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 114 and 116 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
145. A recent federal law on telemarketing has been described as a privacy law, but
in fact only regulates nuisance telephone calls by limiting unwanted commercial solici-
tations that involve pre-recorded messages or automatic dialing equipment. See Tele-
phone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (1991).
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III. TAMING THE FRONTIER-STATE RIGHTS OF
INFORMATION PRIVACY?
Most states provide some protection to individuals for pri-
vacy concerns through common law rights and statutory provi-
sions. While the common law rights do not focus on data
processing activities and no state has a comprehensive privacy
protection statute applicable to commercial information process-
ing, these state rights tend to cover a broader range of privacy
concerns than the federal laws. There is, however, little uni-
formity in the treatment of privacy issues by the different states.
The scope of protection and the completeness of protection vary
substantially by state. This section will analyze the common law
privacy rights, statutory protections and assess the unsatisfied
concerns.
A. Common Law Privacy Rights
Since publication in 1890 of the seminal Warren and Bran-
deis article on privacy, 146 state courts have developed a set of
common law torts to protect against invasions of privacy.147
Four types of actionable invasions are generally recognized:
(1) the intrusion upon one's seclusion; (2) the public disclosure
of private facts; (3) publicity that places one in a false light; and
(4) the misappropriation of one's name or likeness for commer-
cial purposes. 14  Courts in most states have recognized one or
more of these privacy invasions1 49 and many states have codified
146. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 18.
147. See Prosser, supra note 19. In addition to these rights of privacy, communica-
tions made within certain special relationships, such as those between doctor and pa-
tient and attorney and client, are protected from disclosure in court and by
professional confidentiality obligations. These common law duties restrict profession-
als from disclosing information about individual clients without the client's consent.
148. See id. Prosser used these four categories in his work as reporter for the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977) and courts have regularly adopted these cate-
gorizations. See id. §§ 652, 652 app.
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A app. reporter's note (1989 &
Supp. 1990). See also Kelly v. Franco, 391 N.E.2d 54, 57-58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)
(holding that Illinois protects only against the misappropriation of a person's name or
likeness for commercial purposes); Strutner v. Dispatch Printing Co., 442 N.E.2d 129,
134 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (holding that Ohio has not adopted false light privacy tort);
Kalian v. People Acting Through Community Effort, 408 A.2d 608 (R.I. 1979) (hold-
ing that Rhode Island recognizes only limited common law rights of privacy).
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at least one aspect in civil or criminal statutes. 150 For many of
these states, however, not all of the privacy invasions are action-
able. New York, for example, rejects all but the misappropria-
tion claim.15 1 Minnesota is even said to reject all four of these
rights of privacy. 52
Because these common law rights evolved largely in re-
sponse to news-media and advertising cases, there are few deci-
sions that analyze the privacy issues in other contexts. These
protections against invasions of privacy may, nevertheless, apply
to commercial data processing activities and may offer limited
privacy protection.
1. Intrusion Upon Seclusion
Under the right of seclusion, an individual is protected
against improper conduct in connection with the gathering of
personal information. A violation occurs through the inten-
tional intrusion "upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his
private affairs." 153 The conduct must be highly offensive to a
reasonable person in order for an individual to be able to qualify
for this protection. 154  Although there need not be a physical
invasion of one's home or private places, 55 if the personal infor-
mation is openly visible to the public, there cannot be an
intrusion. 56
150. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 540.08 (West 1988); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § 3A (Law. Co-op. 1986); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-201 to
-211 (1987); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW, §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1990); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 839.1 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-1-28 to 9-1-28.1 (1985);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1103, 47-25-1105 (1988 & Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 45-3-3 (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.50(2) (West 1983).
151. See, e.g., Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 487-88 (N.Y. 1952);
Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hospital, 531 N.Y.S.2d 735 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
152. See ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, A COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRI-
VACY RIGHTS 29 (1988).
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). See Prosser, supra note
19, at 389-90.
154. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B; Prosser, supra note 19, at
389-90.
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b; Prosser, supra note
19, at 390.
156. See, e.g., Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding that when permission granted for taking of photograph, subject matter no
longer a private concern and republication will not constitute an intrusion of privacy),
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In the context of data processing activities, an invasion of
this right can only result from the techniques used to collect per-
sonal information. Voluntarily disclosed personal information
will be outside the scope of this right.1 5 7 Even if information is
not voluntarily revealed, the particular means used to collect
personal information must be highly offensive. Surreptitious or
secret collections of personal information without notice or con-
sent may be considered harmful by individuals, yet not rise to a
sufficiently "objectionable" level to meet the threshold stan-
dard. 15 8 In any event, this right does not address other data pro-
tection practices such as the storage, use and disclosure of
personal information.
2. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
The common law right against the public disclosure of pri-
vate facts15 9 can cover particular uses of certain types of personal
information. This right does not address privacy concerns for
data collection or storage. To violate the right, the personal in-
formation must not generally be available or visible to the pub-
lic' 6° and the information must relate to one's "private life."
161
In addition, the nature of the disclosure must be highly offensive
to a reasonable person and may not be of legitimate concern to
the public.1 6 1
Personal information voluntarily disclosed or available
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1080 (1989). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652B cmt. c; Prosser, supra note 19, at 391.
157. See Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411, 416 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that
search of files containing information about plaintiff's prior insurance history with
defendant was not "evidence of objectionable snooping techniques"); Graham, supra
note 5, at 1413.
158. However, some commentators have argued that any unauthorized access to
personal information contained in databases compiled from public sources should be
considered objectionable. McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 842.
159. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TQRTS § 652D; Prosser, supra note 19, at
392-98.
160. See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953) (holding that
plaintiff's embrace of his wife did not relate to a private matter because the kiss oc-
curred in a public place).
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D; Prosser, supra note 19, at
392-98.
162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D; Prosser, supra note 19, at
397.
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from public sources does not benefit from this protection. 6 As
a result, activities such as the preparation and dissemination of
intimate personal profiles from disparate public sources of infor-
mation or public revelations of information would not be action-
able. Recovery under this right further requires that there be a
dissemination of qualifying personal information to the general
public. 1' 4 This is interpreted to mean general distribution to
the public such as the circulation of a newspaper and not just
circulation of personal information among a closed group of
people. 165
Many commercial data processing activities are unlikely to
satisfy the standard of offensiveness, the condition that the per-
sonal information relate to non-disclosed matters, or the require-
ment of general public distribution. These thresholds thus
restrict this right significantly even when important privacy con-
cerns are raised by private sector information processing
activities.
3. False Light Publicity
The right to be "secure from publicity that places [a] person
in a false light before the public"1 6 6 can address one privacy
concern raised by data processing activities-the use of inaccu-
rate information.1 67 Specifically, this right can provide protec-
tion against the dissemination of personal information that is
misleading or erroneous.1 68 Data processing activities that in-
volve truthful and non-misleading personal information are not
covered by this action.
163. See Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953).
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a; Prosser, supra note
19, at 393.
165. See, e.g., Polin v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 768 F.2d 1204 (10th Cir. 1985)
(circulation of credit report to 17 subscribers of reporting service is insufficient public-
ity to be actionable); Senogles v. Security Benefit Life Ins. Co., 536 P.2d 1358 (Kan.
1975) (holding that insurance company's dissemination of applicant's medical history
to a trade association, Medical Information Bureau, not actionable).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E. See Prosser, supra note 19, at
398-401.
167. This right is very similar to the common law protection against defamation.
See Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank, 534 N.E.2d 987, 988-91 (Ill. 1989). A dis-
cussion of defamation law is beyond the scope of this article.
168. See, e.g., Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3rd Cir. 1951) (photo-
graph of non-negligent child used to illustrate article on children's negligence); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E; Prosser, supra note 19, at 398-401.
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The false light claim can be made only if there is a wide
dissemination of misleading or erroneous personal information.
An individual cannot prevail if the disclosure was made in the
context of a private communication, even if the dissemination
was made to a group of people or business entities. 169 As a re-
sult, this action is not likely to be particularly useful for individ-
uals in the context of commercial data processing activities
where there is no public offering of inaccurate personal
information.
4. Misappropriation of an Individual's Name
A right exists against "one who appropriates to his own use
or benefit the name or likeness of another." 170 This protection
against the misappropriation of one's name may offer coverage
for privacy concerns associated with some commercial data
processing activities. 171 The right originally emerged to address
unauthorized endorsements in advertisements and commercial
uses of photographs of individuals.1 72 Yet it is possible that this
right could apply to ban certain uses, including dissemination, of
personal information for commercial purposes without consent.
However, privacy concerns associated with the collection of per-
sonal information-notice and consent to data acquisition, un-
necessary data compilation, and accuracy of data-and the
storage of personal information would be outside the scope of
this misappropriation right.
The courts often point out that this right protects narrowly
against the appropriation of the value of one's personality17 3 and
169. See Polin v. Dun & Bradstreet, 768 F.2d 1204 (holding that a communication
to 17 business entities does not constitute "publicity"). See also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 652E cmt. a (using the same standard for publicity established in
comment a of § 652D for public disclosure of private facts: the communication must
be "to the public at large" and not merely a private communication); Graham, supra
note 5, at 1412.
170. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C; Prosser, supra note 19, at
401-07.
171. See Graham, supra note 5, at 1412 (arguing that this tort "affords little pro-
tection against invasion of information privacy by the misuse of information");
George B. Trubow, Protecting Informational Privacy in the Information Society, 10 N.
ILL. U. L. REv. 521, 539 (1990) (arguing that the sale of mailing lists is tortious).
172. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
173. See, eg., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff, 184 S.E. 452, 454 (Ga.
1936); Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 480 N.E.2d 349, 353 (N.Y. 1985); Bartholomew v.
Workman, 169 P.2d 1012, 1014 (Okla. 1946). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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a privilege usually exists for media uses due to federal and state
constitutional protections of free expression." 4 If personal infor-
mation can be considered to invoke an individual's "personal-
ity," then the use might be regulated. When the personal
information being processed approaches a profile of an individ-
ual, it is possible to view commercial uses as an appropriation of
one's personality. Although the use of a name and address in
itself, for example, might not constitute an appropriation of that
individual's personality, if the degree of personal information
portrays aspects of the individual's lifestyle (e.g., wine collecting
based on a list of all wealthy wine drinkers with an affinity for
fine French cognac), the information profile could be considered
a reflection of the individual's personality. As such, it might
thus be within the scope of this protection. In these instances,
the right would restrict the use giving rise to commercial gain
rather than the collection or storage of that personal
information.
Although reported cases do not seem to address this inva-
sion of privacy in the context of data processing, one old Ohio
case gives a confused discussion of the use of a personality pro-
file under the misappropriation theory. In Shibley v. Time,
Inc.,175 the Ohio court ruled against a plaintiff who argued that
the sale of his name and address as part of a mailing list was an
appropriation of a personality profile and, thus, an invasion of
privacy. The court relied on the argument that there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the mailbox and that no
misappropriation of Shibley's personality could occur without a
display to the public. In general, courts do not require an expec-
tation of privacy or publicity as elements of this invasion of pri-
vacy.176 The Shibley court did not, in fact, assess whether the
TORTS § 652C cmt. c (stating that the appropriation must be of another's "reputation,
prestige, social or commercial standing [or] public interest").
174. See, e.g., Arrington v. New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319 (N.Y. 1982)
(interpreting the New York codification of this common law right), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1146 (1983).
175. 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio App. 1975).
176. See, e.g., Coleman v. Ted's Auto Sales, Inc., 227 N.Y.S.2d 693 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct.), aff'd, 17 A.D.2d 827 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962) (holding that a cause of action arose
from defendant's unauthorized use in credit application of plaintiff's name as an asso-
ciate of business partnership); Griffin v. Harris, Beach, Wilcox, Rubin and Levey, 481
N.Y.S.2d 963 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (noting that the unauthorized use in a credit appli-
cation of an individual's name as a named plaintiff would constitute an invasion of
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mailing list reflected Shibley's personality. Significantly, in New
York, where this right has been codified, there is some case sup-
port prohibiting dealing in photographs that could also apply to
mail list brokers. 177
B. Statutory Protection
In addition to the common law protection against invasions
of privacy, most states have enacted some statutory rights that
apply to industry.1 8 Three approaches can be discerned among
privacy under common law, but not under the New York statute because the defend-
ant did not receive an economic benefit as the direct result of the unauthorized use;
court distinguishes Coleman on the grounds that in that case the circulation of a credit
application was an advertisement); Goodyear v. Vandergriff, 184 S.E. at 454 (plaintiff's
name used without permission to gain access to confidential price quotes); Hinish v.
Meier & Frank Co., 113 P.2d 438, 448 (Ore. 1941) (plaintiff's name signed without
consent on telegram to governor). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652C cmt. b, illus. 3-5 (cases in which publication does not occur).
177. See Arrington v. New York Times, 434 N.E.2d at 1323-24. This landmark New
York Court of Appeals decision supports the view that section 51 of the New York
Civil Rights Law (codifying the misappropriation invasion of privacy) should be appli-
cable to sales of name-linked information. Arrington sued the Times for publishing
his photograph without his consent. The court held that the Times could not be liable
because of the media privilege. But significantly, the court held that the dealer, Con-
tact Press Images, who sold the photograph of Arrington without consent could be
liable under section 51.
The court ruled that dealer's liability could exist notwithstanding the Times'
right to publish the photograph. Ia at 1323-24, and specifically refused a motion for
reargument on this point. 454 N.Y.S.2d 75 (N.Y. 1982). The court said that Contact
Press Images had commercialized the photograph in furtherance of trade. Although
the legislature responded the following year and amended section 51 to protect mid-
dlemen who sell photographs to newspapers for publication, dealers in photographs
are still subject to liability if the end use of the photograph is prohibited by section 51.
See 1983 N.Y. Laws 280, reprinted in 1983 N.Y. STATE LEGIS. ANNUAL 124 (memo-
randum of Senator H. Douglas Barclay) ("The purpose of this bill is to correct the
inadvertent effect of a 1982 decision of the New York Court of Appeals which could
seriously limit the availability of photographs taken by freelance photographers for
use by major news organizations.").
Dealing in names presents a situation analogous to that of merchandising photo-
graphs. Collecting and selling personal information is very much like acquiring and
selling photographs. The statute, as well as the common law tort, proscribes the use
of "names" in the same manner that it restricts the use of photographs. As a result, it
appears that section 51 could prohibit any use for commercial purposes of the names
of individuals without their consent. New York also requires that such consent be in
writing. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1990).
178. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-1l-30 to -11-37 (1982 & Supp. 1990); CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 990, 1747.8, 3344 (West Supp. 1991); CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.5 (West
1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-422, 53-450 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 925, 1335, 1336 (1987 & Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN.
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these statutory rights. At least two states, Massachusetts and
Wisconsin, have adopted general rights of privacy, 179 though
these rights seem to be viewed only as expressions of the com-
mon law torts.18 0 A substantial number of states have codified
one or more of the four common law invasions of privacy.18 1
And many states have enacted industry-specific legislation
containing a variety of privacy rights in fields such as financial
services, 182 telecommunications, 183 home entertainment and in-
§ 540.08 (West 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. oh. 17, $ 360 (Smith-Hurd 1981 & Supp.
1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 87-1 to 87-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-
A, § 511 (West 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 214 §§ 1B, 3A (Law. Co-op. 1986);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539 (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A (West
1983 & Supp. 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201 to -211 (1987); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 644.9 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359C:1-18 (1984); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:16K-3 (West 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:5A-54 to -63 (West Supp. 1991); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 56-3-1 to 56-3-8 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1990); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW
§§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-10 (1981 & Supp. 1989);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.1, 839.2 (West 1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN,
§§ 5701-5775 (1983 & Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 9-1-28, 9-1-28.1 (Supp.
1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-21-1, 22-21-3 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 45-10-104, 47-25-1103, 47-25-1105 (1988 & Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-
3-1 to 45-3-6, 77-23a-I to 77-23a-16 (1988 & Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40
(Michie 1984 & Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
See also SMITH, supra note 152.
179. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § lB (Law. Co-op. 1986) ("A person shall
have a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his pri-
vacy."); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.50(1) (West 1983) ("The right of privacy is recog-
nized in this state.").
180. Massachusetts treats the general right of privacy as a right of protection
against the publication of private facts. See Bratt v. IBM Corp., 467 N.E.2d 126, 136
(Mass. 1984). However, the standard of publicity is lower than the traditional com-
mon law requirement and limited intracorporate circulation of personal information
could suffice. Consequently, this right would have slightly broader applications in
Massachusetts than the common law action. In Wisconsin, the statute limits the gen-
eral right to the intrusion, publicity of private facts, and misappropriation torts. See
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.50(2) (West 1983); Zinda v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 440
N.W.2d 548, 554-55 (Wis. 1989).
181. See supra note 150. Text accompanying notes 153-77 provides an analysis of
these rights. In states that have not adopted all four of the common law rights, the
remaining actions for invasions of privacy are often unavailable. For example, no
common law or non-statutory rights of privacy are recognized in New York or Vir-
ginia. See Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hosp., 531 N.Y.S.2d 735 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1988); Falwell v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1206-07 (W.D. Va. 1981).
Massachusetts has not adopted the false light invasion of privacy. See Elm Medical
Lab., Inc. v. RKO General, Inc., 532 N.E.2d 675 (Mass. 1989). But see UTAH CODE
ANN. § 45-3-6 (1988) (The Abuse of Personal Identity Act "does not limit or super-
sede any causes of action otherwise available to the parties.").
182. See infra notes 188-197 and accompanying text.
Number 2] PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 229
formation services, 184  employment records, 8  insurance
records186 as well as a few special sets of protection.187 Like the
federal industry-specific laws, each state law generally seeks to
resolve a narrow problem within a given industry and does not
systematically address all the privacy concerns relating to the
acquisition, storage, transmission, use and disclosure of personal
information. Analysis of the state industry-specific regulation
shows the limited and ad hoc nature of these rights.
1. Personal Information and Financial Services
As at the federal level, statutory protection is also granted
by some states against credit reporting activities.'8 s Each state
with legislation may offer different degrees of protection to indi-
viduals in addition to the federal rights.189 Generally, the state
statutes restrict the purposes for which personal information
may be disseminated and grant individuals rights of access and
rights to challenge the accuracy of stored information. Some of
the laws limit the types of information that may be contained in
credit fies, namely, data relating to race, religion and sexual ori-
entation and limit information that can be stored for indefinite
periods of time such as bankruptcy records, information about
bad debts, drug or alcohol addictions, and any other adverse in-
formation. 90 As with the federal FCRA, these laws do not uni-
formly address notice or consent to the collection of personal
information, associated uses of personal information, or the du-
ration of storage of most types of personal information. Two
states with substantial credit processing facilities, South Dakota
and New Jersey, do not, however, offer additional statutory pro-
183. See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
184. See infra notes 201-203 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 204-208 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 209-211 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 212-214 and accompanying text.
188. Congress has authorized the states to adopt non-conflicting rights. See 15
U.S.C. § 1681t.
189. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:3571 (West 1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, §§ 1311-1329 (West 1980 & Supp. 1990); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, §§ 50-68
(Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-3-1 to 56-3-8 (Michie
1986 & Supp. 1990); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 380 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1991).
190. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1321 (West 1980 & Supp. 1990);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 380j (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1991).
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tection to supplement the federal rights.191
States may also regulate personal information in connection
with electronic fund transfers. The federal law does not preempt
consistent state regulation. 192 These state laws do not generally
restrict the overbroad collection of personal information nor the
duration of storage of personal information. They may, however,
provide additional restrictions on the dissemination of transac-
tion records. 193 New Jersey, for example, permits the disclosure
to a third party of information relative to an electronic fund
transfer only in specified circumstances: if the disclosure is nec-
essary to complete the transaction; if the client gives written con-
sent; if the disclosure is necessary to resolve or investigate errors;
or if the disclosure is for the purpose of verifying the existence
and condition of an account for a third party, including credit
bureaus and merchants.1 94 Permissible disclosure for verifica-
tion purposes does, in practice, mean that the financial institu-
tion will have significant authority to disclose electronic fund
transfer activities.
A few states have prohibited the collection of certain types
of unnecessary personal information in response to credit fraud
problems. 195 Specifically, these laws limit a merchant's ability to
mark on a customer's credit card charge form, personal informa-
tion including the individual's address and telephone number.
Virginia prohibits merchants from requiring a customer to re-
veal a credit card number when payment for a transaction is to
be made by check.1 96 Several national retail stores, such as the
consumer electronics chains Radio Shack and Newmark &
191. Such rights might protect the residents of the state, such as local cardholders,
as well as ensure fair information practices by local card issuers and local transaction
processing companies.
192. 15 U.S.C. § 1693q.
193. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 167B, § 16 (Law. Co-op. 1987); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17:16K-3 (West 1984).
194. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16K-3 (West 1984).
195. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.8 (West Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 914 (Supp. 1990); MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-318 (Supp. 1991); N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 520-a (McKinney Supp. 1991); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 62A.3-
512 (West Supp. 1991). If a cardholder's name, account number, expiration date,
address and telephone number are available, fraudulent charges may easily be made to
the card account. These laws seek to protect cardholders and card issuers from
merchants' practices that may facilitate such crime.
196. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-33.1 (Michie Supp. 1991). See also DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 915 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 832.075 (West Supp. 1991).
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Lewis, still have computer systems that are not configured to
process sales, including cash sales, without a customer's name
and address.
Some states, such as Illinois and Connecticut, have enacted
laws restricting the permissible disclosures of bank customer fi-
nancial information including information on bank account ac-
tivity.1 97 These confidentiality laws affect the uses of personal
information only.
2. Personal Information and Telecommunications Services
Communications privacy statutes, similar to the federal
ECPA, also exist at the state level.198 These state criminal laws
sometimes grant greater protections than the federal statute
against unauthorized access to communications. Like the fed-
eral law, the state statutes generally prohibit the collection and
storage of the contents of a communication without at least one
party's consent. Some states go further than the federal law and
restrict the collection or use of transaction data (i.e., the identi-
ties of the parties to a communication and existence of the com-
munication). Pennsylvania, for example, generally prohibits
the use of pen registers or trap and trace devices to collect trans-
action information. 199 Pennsylvania also requires the consent of
both parties to a communication in order for disclosures of the
contents or disseminations of transaction data to be
permissible.20o
Like the federal laws, the state statutes generally do not ad-
dress issues of the duration of the storage of personal informa-
tion such as transaction records, the unnecessary collection of
personal information or associated uses of personal information.
197. See, ag., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-9k (West 1987); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 17,
360(c) (Smith-Hurd 1981 & Supp. 1991).
198. See, ag., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-11-30 to 13A-11-37 (1982); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, §§ 1335-1336 (1987 & Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.02(2)-(3)
(West Supp. 1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5701-5775 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
199. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5771 (Supp. 1991).
200. Pennsylvania is a two-party consent state. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5704(4) (1983 & Supp. 1991). A Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has recently
ruled against the introduction of caller identification without the consent of both par-
ties to the communication. See Barasch v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 576 A.2d
79 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990), aff'd, Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Bell, No. 201,
202, 1992 Pa. S. Ct. LEXIS 242.
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3. Personal Information and Home Entertainment and
Information Services
In several states, home entertainment and home informa-
tion service record-keeping activities may be subject to specific
protections. 20 1 Federal law authorizes the states to adopt more
restrictive laws for the protection of certain personal informa-
tion related to home entertainment. 20 2 Like the federal laws, the
existing state laws tend to limit the kinds of personal informa-
tion that may be collected about subscribers to cable television
and video rental services, though some extend the protections to
electronic information services offered to households, such as
Prodigy, CompuServe, or Dialog. The statutes also limit the
manner of collection of personal information from subscribers.
In addition, they contain stricter prohibitions on the dissemina-
tion of information about subscribers including the identities of
subscribers and details about those subscribers' use of particular
electronic information services, cable viewing selections, or
video rental film choices. It is significant to note that New
Jersey, a state with a major processing center for cable billing
records, has a law protecting against the dissemination of infor-
mation about cable subscribers and their viewing habits.20 3
Where other local laws provide fewer privacy rights, New Jersey
risks the loss of cable processing businesses. Nevertheless, the
state believes that privacy protection is important.
4. Personal Information and Employment Records
A number of states require privacy for personnel record-
keeping activities.z° Some states impose limits on the type of
201. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1799.3 (West Supp. 1991) (video rental privacy); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 637.5 (West 1988) (cable communications privacy); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 53-420 to -422 (West 1985) (cable and information services privacy);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-450 (West Supp. 1991) (video rental privacy); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 925 (Supp. 1990) (video rental privacy); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 445.1711-.1715 (West Supp. 1991) (video rental privacy); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 48:5A-54 to -63 (West Supp. 1991) (cable services privacy); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 11-18-32 (Supp. 1990) (video rental privacy); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 134.43 (West
1989) (cable services privacy).
202. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(f).
203. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:5A-54 to -63 (West Supp. 1991).
204. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1198.5 (West 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 31-128a to -128h (West 1987); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 48, 11 2001-2012 (Smith-Hurd
1986 & Supp. 1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 52C (Law. Co-op. 1989).
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personal information that may be maintained concerning em-
ployees, such as lifestyle information."' But these state laws
generally do not address the manner or scope of data collec-
tion20 6 or the storage of most types of personal information.
The laws do tend to provide employees with rights of access to
employers' personnel records and require that employers investi-
gate any complaints about accuracy. Under some of the laws,
employees are granted a right to have an explanatory statement
included in any file when there is an unresolved dispute regard-
ing accuracy of personal information.07 In addition, some state
laws may require that an employee give consent before the em-
ployer discloses any personal information to third parties, except
for disclosures made to verify an employee's dates of employ-
ment, title or position, and wage or salary.20 8
5. Personal Information and Insurance Records
Many states have adopted statutory guidelines for the col-
lection, use and dissemination of personal information by insur-
ance companies.20 9 These laws generally require that notice be
given to individuals prior to the collection of personal informa-
tion. Insurance companies are sometimes required to grant indi-
viduals access to files containing personal information and to
have a procedure for correcting errors.210 Some laws limit the
use of certain information in making adverse insurance deci-
sions. The District of Columbia, for example, prohibits the col-
lection or use of information concerning the AIDS virus or other
blood test results for underwriting decisions.211 The insurance
205. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, 2009 (Smith-Hurd 1986); MASs. ANN. LAWS
ch. 149, § 52C (Law. Co-op. 1989).
206. But see infra note 213 and accompanying text. Some states have rules pro-
hibiting employers from asking job applicants certain personal information. See, e.g.,
N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(1)(d) (McKinney 1984); Holland v. Edwards, 119 N.E.2d
581 (N.Y. 1954). These rules are designed to prevent unlawful employment
discrimination.
207. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-128e (West 1987); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
149, § 52C (Law. Co-op. 1989).
208. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-128f (West 1987).
209. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35.221 to .229 (1988 & Supp. 1990); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-39-1 to 33-39-23 (Harrison 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, 1 1065.701 to
.724 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991).
210. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-508, 38-509 (West 1987); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-39-9, 33-39-10 (Harrison 1990).
211. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-224 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
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statutes do not, however, generally address concerns related to
unnecessary collections of personal information or the storage of
obsolete personal information.
6. Personal Information and Special Protections
Some additional and curious privacy rights are also found
in state statutes. In California, for example, anyone in the busi-
ness of organizing car pools is prohibited from disclosing to
others any personal information (such as name, address, place of
employment, and hours of employment) collected for the pur-
pose of making car pool arrangements.212
A variety of state laws deal with other privacy protection
issues, such as polygraph testing for employees and AIDS test-
ing.213 These laws generally do not deal with issues of data mini-
mization or data quality (including rights of access and
correction). Instead, they restrict certain types of data collection
techniques such as the polygraph or restrict disclosures of medi-
cal test results. Most states, in fact, have statutory prohibitions
on the disclosure of medical records without the patient's
consent.2 14
C. The Open Range of Unsatisfied Concerns
The state rights of privacy do not consistently fill the gaps
left by the federal industry-specific protections. The four. com-
mon law rights can cover some aspects of commercial data
processing activities, but remain far from satisfying the privacy
concerns left untouched by federal law. The seclusion right can
only apply in limited circumstances to the collection of personal
information.2 15 False light publicity and publicity to private
matters only address particular types of disseminations of per-
sonal information 216 and the misappropriation right might only
cover uses of profile information.2 17 In addition, without firm
precedents, the slow and costly legal process for aggrieved indi-
212. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.6 (West Supp. 1991).
213. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1990) (polygraph testing); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 19203-19208 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990) (AIDS testing).
214. See SMITH, supra note 153, at 21-24.
215. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 159-69 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
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viduals seeking recovery and the difficulty of proving damages in
tort serve as a discouragement to the vindication of privacy
invasions.
The state statutory rights similarly do not generally afford
protection to the concerns left untreated by federal legislation.
In the context of financial services, complementary state regula-
tion may restrict the storage of certain types of sensitive infor-
mation for credit reporting activities218 and the disclosure of
electronic fund records2 19 and banking records,220 and some fur-
ther statutory rights may prevent the collection of unnecessary
information in connection with certain forms of payment.221 Yet
on the whole, issues of notice and consent to the collection of
personal information, associated uses of personal information
and the duration of storage of personal information are not ad-
dressed for most financial services.
For telecommunications services, state protections are also
confined to the narrow range of privacy concerns seen in federal
law. Although some states may address the collection and use of
the contents as well as transaction information,222 the statutes
usually do not focus on the collection of excessive amounts of
personal information, associated uses of personal information or
the duration of storage of personal information.
State legislation similarly tends to avoid most of the privacy
concerns in the workplace. While some states have statutes gov-
erning personnel record-keeping and a particular information
gathering technique (polygraphs), the state laws generally ignore
issues of information collection, associated use of personnel in-
formation and the duration of storage of employees' personal
information.223
In several isolated industries, however, the states have
adopted legislation that addresses each of the privacy concerns.
Like the federal laws, state legislation on home entertainment
gives considered treatment to each of the privacy concerns for
218. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
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cable and video services.224 In some cases, the states go further
and apply these same rules to information services provided to
households.225 In the insurance industry, state regulation covers
the collection, use and dissemination of personal information,
though not all aspects are targeted, such as the collection of un-
necessary information and the duration of storage.226
The failure of state common law and statutory rights to re-
spond fully to each of the privacy concerns associated with com-
mercial information processing is emphasized by the varying
acceptance in different state courts of common law privacy
rights227 and by the varying adoption in state legislatures of stat-
utory protection. The diversity of state legislation nevertheless
appears to cover more subject matter areas than existing federal
legislation. However, each state has its own separate set of stat-
utory rights and few, if any, of the fifty states cover a significant
portion of the entire list of common law and statutory examples.
Systematically available privacy rights appear to remain at the
frontier of unresolved problems for the existing information
economy.
IV. A MISSION FOR THE CAVALRY-FRAMING THE
DEBATE FOR INTELLIGENT INFORMATION PRIVACY
PROTECTION
228
Since information processing occurs today throughout
every industry, the privacy concerns are not unique to activities
in any one context. Because privacy rights in the United States
for commercial information processing depend on legislation
targeted at narrow problems and rather limited common law
rights, the lack of a coherent and systematic approach to existing
privacy concerns presents an undesirable policy void. The mul-
titude of non-comprehensive and overlapping federal and state
224. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 201.
226. See supra notes 209-211 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 149, 151, 152.
228. A number of points in this discussion draw heavily on a paper prepared by the
author for a workshop organized by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
and the Electronic Frontier Foundation held in Washington, D.C., June 25-26, 1991.
See Joel R. Reidenberg, Developing Cyberspace Privacy Policy: A Working Paper on
the Legal Challenge for the Private Sector, prepared for the Symposium on "Civilizing
Cyberspace: Minding the Matrix" (June 1991).
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laws makes the task of identifying the rights of individuals and
the obligations of entities processing personal information diffi-
cult to discern, if they are available at all. The majority of indus-
try is not fully dealing with these issues229 and the globalization
of information processing networks230 leaves companies in the
United States vulnerable to foreign regulatory impediments im-
posed on the basis of privacy concerns.231 Without consistently
available rights treating each privacy concern, individuals can-
not enforce fair information practices for the treatment of per-
sonal information. This suggests that the legal approach for
commercial data processing activities needs to be restructured in
the United States.
In considering a new approach to information privacy pro-
tection, a variety of issues will have critical significance for the
success of any attempt to deal with the privacy concerns. Other
ways of addressing these concerns in different countries may of-
fer illustrative guidance for United States policy. The European
frameworks take a more formal approach to the treatment of
privacy concerns. Europeans have not historically been hesitant
to regulate commercial activities and several European countries
have adopted omnibus legislation governing private sector data
processing. 232 Among these broad laws, there are a number of
important differences relating to the scope of coverage and the
regulatory enforcement mechanisms.233 In particular, several of
229. See EQUIFAX REPORT, supra note 13, at 98 (noting that only 32% of corpo-
rate spokespeople, 20% of banks and thrifts, 18% of credit grantors, and 14% of
insurance companies surveyed said their companies had formed a board or panel de-
voted to privacy issues).
230. See, e.g., Herman & Halvey, supra note 53, at 12 ("[lit has become common-
place for a bank to transmit customer account information and other financial data on
individual and corporate customers... across international borders.").
231. See supra note 16.
232. See supra notes 15 and 23.
233. Most of the laws establish a data protection agency with enforcement powers
over the private sector. Most of the national laws require registration with the regula-
tory agency prior to the commencement of any data processing activities. In general,
no use may be made of personal information for purposes which are not registered
with the data protection agency. If the regulatory agency denies registration, no data
processing activities may occur. These registration schemes have posed a number of
sensitive problems for data processing. Often the registration process can in itself be
intrusive to the point of stifling new legitimate activities. Similarly, it can be difficult
to determine whether a particular use of personal information is within the scope of a
registered purpose. See NUGTER, supra note 15; Flaherty, supra note 5.
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the laws apply protections to legal persons as well as natural
persons, 231 several apply protection to manual files as well as
computer records, 235 and several impose more stringent restric-
tions on third party disclosures of personal information. The
regulatory principles in many of the national laws are more de-
tailed than those found in the European Convention.236 For ex-
ample, the French law specifically requires that individuals be
given notice prior to any data collection.237 The Commission of
the European Community believes that the effect of these differ-
ences is likely to impede the development of the single European
market and has proposed a directive to harmonize these laws
and establish a community standard of privacy protection.238
The European experience suggests that the precise enumer-
ation of legal rights or principles addressing the privacy con-
cerns of data collection (including notice, consent, necessity, and
accuracy), 239 uses (including associated uses) 24° and the duration
2412of storage' requires careful consideration.242
The proper jurisdictional level for any new American ap-
proach is also a threshold issue. Because personal information
flows are not confined to state or national borders, it may be
most appropriate to adopt any new rights at the federal level.
Differences in privacy protection among the states could readily
have adverse or distorting effects on interstate commerce and
international data flows. 243 Business has historically supported
234. Countries that have enacted such laws include Austria and Luxembourg. See
Data Protection Roundup, PRIVACY L. & Bus., July 1991, at 2, 7; CoMMISSION OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE TEDIS-EDI LEGAL WORKSHOP, Eur. Comm.
Doc. AT/dd(89)1814, at 82 (July 24, 1989).
235. Countries that have enacted such laws include Holland, France, Germany
and Denmark. See Data Protection Roundup, PRIVACY L. & Bus., July 1991, at 2-7;
TEDIS-EDI LEGAL WORKSHOP, supra note 234, at 84-85.
236. See supra note 23.
237. See Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative a l'informatique, aux fichiers et
aux libertes, art. 27, J.O. du 7 janvier 1978, modified, J.O. du 25 janvier 1978.
238. See Draft EC Directive, supra note 15.
239. See supra notes 26-41 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
242. Discussion of the specific formulation of principles responding to privacy con-
cerns is beyond the scope of this Article. A variety of examples can be found for
drafting such language. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 20; European Convention,
supra note 20; Draft EC Directive, supra note 15.
243. See supra notes 16 and 53.
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uniformity of any mandatory rules to avoid the confusion of fifty
separate sets of state privacy regulations.2 "
Sensitivity to the commercial needs of an information econ-
omy is also an important consideration for any new framework.
Industry is properly worried that constraints on processing of
personal information may impose cost burdens on legitimate
activities, whether or not those activities are truly objectionable
to individuals, and may hamper the development of information
processing networks;245 consumers overwhelmingly desire the
benefits that accrue from information processing activities, such
as the ready availability of credit at low costs. 246 A balance must
exist if the business environment is to be conducive to the devel-
opment of new information services and information
networks.247
In thinking about a workable balance between privacy con-
cerns and commercial needs, policy-makers should consider that
the depth of any particular concern is likely to vary with each
specific data processing activity.248 For example, associated uses
244. See PRIVACY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 32.
245. Notice obligations for the collection of disclosed information or the storage of
transaction information could, in many instances, pose substantial difficulties and ad-
ded costs for the processing entities. New technologies may give rise to associated
uses for information that were unforeseeable at the time the personal information was
originally compiled. These associated uses may be highly desirable from the individ-
ual's point of view and could be too costly to accomplish if strict notice or consent
requirements were to be applied rigorously to such uses. See EQUIFAX REPORT, supra
note 13, at VIII; Hearings II, supra note 30, at 46-47 (statement of Richard A. Bar-
ton, Senior Vice President, Gov't Affairs, Direct Marketing Assoc.).
Even with respect to the storage of personal information, businesses may find
archival data is useful or needed at some unspecified time in the future. To the extent
that such later uses do not raise privacy concerns, restrictions on the storage of per-
sonal information would impose unnecessary burdens on data processing activities.
Similarly, the over-extensive collection of personal information may prove useful at a
later time without implicating individuals' concerns regarding subsequent use or dis-
semination. As a result, businesses seek the flexibility to collect and maintain dis-
closed and transactional information of a broad nature.
246. See EQUIFAX REPORT, supra note 13, at VIII.
247. See Hearings II, supra note 30, at 103-04 (statement of Jerry Saltzgaber,
C.E.O. of Citicorp Point-of-Sale Information Services); PRIVACY COMM'N, supra note
2, at 27-28.
248. In addition, some of the privacy concerns may be resolved through the use of
technology. Recent disputes over caller identification and the Lotus/Equifax market-
ing database partly reflect inappropriate technological infrastructure decisions. Initial
proposals for caller identification chose not to offer blocking functions. Similarly, the
choice of CD-ROM for a marketing database containing personal information on
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and dissemination of personal information is likely to be more
troubling than the storage itself. The specific content of various
types of personal information is also likely to affect the relative
weight given to a particular concern. An individual may be
more troubled by storage of a lifestyle profile than storage of
bank account routing numbers. Similarly, the importance of a
particular concern may depend on whether the personal infor-
mation was disclosed by an individual, resulted from a transac-
tion entered into by the individual, or became available through
other means. For example, if an individual received a sizable
electronic fund transfer, the recipient may be willing to share
that information with a friend, but would be outraged if the
bank disclosed the transaction record to a salesman or if the
amount were deduced by a neighbor from other available
records. On the other hand, an undisclosed collection of per-
sonal information may be more troubling if the information is
obtained directly from an individual as compared to an acquisi-
tion of personal information from a public source. In addition,
there may be further nuances or differences in the application of
privacy concerns that are appropriate in the context of particu-
lar industries. The scope of consent to associated uses of per-
sonal information, for example, may be implicit in one context,
but not in another.
While the public interest suggests that an articulated set of
legal rights respond systematically to the plethora of privacy
concerns, a purely general approach is likely to lead to difficul-
ties balancing individual and commercial interests. Some means
to accommodate both varying contexts for the processing of per-
sonal information and varying levels of concern may be neces-
sary. European models offer an instructive view of some of these
implementation difficulties. The basic principles espoused by the
European Convention have proven ambiguous in a variety of
specific data processing contexts, such as credit card processing,
marketing and telecommunications. To clarify these ambigui-
shopping habits precluded erasure of unwilling participants and the correction of inac-
curate personal information. Information networks may be structured to provide only
the minimal amount of personal information necessary to accomplish a particular task
and to delete personal information as soon as it is no longer needed. Encryption may
also provide a means of assuring some anonymity as well as preventing unauthorized
access to personal information.
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ties, the Council of Europe has developed or issued recommen-
dations on the interpretation of the European Convention in a
number of private sector contexts,249 including direct market-
ing,250 employment relations, 25' and payments.25 2 These recom-
mendations, while not binding on treaty signatories or industry,
reflect the difficulty of trying to apply general principles to rap-
idly changing information processing activities. The Commis-
sion of the European Communities has similarly explored
industry applications for telecommunications services. 3
The trend in more recent European national legislation also
recognizes the complexity of the information economy and the
need for greater flexibility. British law, for example, provides a
set of general principles and recognizes particular industry appli-
cations for health and social work, financial services and educa-
tion.25 4 It also provides a number of exemptions for particular
data processing activities such as payroll and accounts.25 5 The
Dutch law, while setting out broad privacy rights, allows indus-
try groups to develop sectoral privacy codes.256 When approved
by the Dutch regulatory agency, these codes effectively provide a
safe-harbor from prosecution for data processing activities that
comply with the relevant code.
249. The European Convention established a Consultative Committee to make ad-
visory opinions and recommendations on the application of these principles for partic-
ular situations. See European Convention, supra note 20, at arts. 18-19.
250. Council of Europe Recommendation R(85)(20) on the Protection of Personal
Data used for Purposes of Direct Marketing (Oct. 25, 1985).
251. Council of Europe Recommendation R(89)(2) on the Protection of Personal
Data used for Employment Purposes (Jan. 18, 1989).
252. Council of Europe Recommendation R(90)(19) on the Protection of Personal
Data Used for Payment and other Related Operations (Sept. 13, 1990).
253. See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection
of Personal Data and Privacy in the Context of Public Digital Telecommunications
Networks, in Particular the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) and Public
Digital Mobile Networks, 1990 O.J. (C277), COM(90)314 final SYN 288 at 75.
254. See Data Protection Act of 1984, art. 29-30, 35 (Eng.), reprinted in NUGTER,
supra note 15, at 380, 383.
255. Data Protection Act of 1984, art. 29-30, reprinted in NUGTER, supra note 15,
at 381.
256. See Act of 28th December 1988 providing rules for the protection of privacy
in connection with personal data files, Council of Eur. Doc. No. CJ-PD(89)4 §§ 15-16
(1989) [hereinafter Data Protection Act of 1988], reprinted in NUGTER, supra note 15,
at 397-410. See also Peter Hustinx, The Dutch Data Protection Bill, PRIVACY L. &
Bus. 11, 14 (Nov. 1988) (noting observation of Dutch Ministry of Justice Legal Advi-
sor on Public law that "we wanted to differentiate according to sectors because these
rules have to be applied to the specific problems of each sector.")
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The implementation problems seen in Europe indicate that
any new American framework should consider a flexible inter-
pretive or application mechanism. Without a flexible means of
applying and implementing any comprehensive rights, general
principles will be unlikely to keep pace with new technologies
and will be likely to hamper the development of new information
services. The Dutch interpretive procedure offers one possible
solution for guidance on rapidly evolving technologies and infor-
mation processing activities.257 In the Dutch example, principles
applicable to all personal information processing may be adapted
to particular contexts by industry experts.258 For this type of
framework to function in the United States, underlying legal
rights will still need to be available.
In the United States, the development of a flexible mecha-
nism raises further issues of regulatory process and enforcement.
If underlying legal rights are elaborated for systematic applica-
tion to information processing activities, one possible approach
to assure flexibility for contextual differences may be the crea-
tion of a privacy board.259 Such a board need not have power to
issue detailed privacy regulations, but might be given authority
to determine if industry codes of practice properly balance pri-
vacy and commercial needs and comply with the underlying
rights. Without creating substantial bureaucracy, a board could
promote consistent privacy guidance for industry and allow a
clear safe-harbor for those information processing organizations
complying with an approved industry-drafted code. Companies
not in compliance with approved codes might then be subject to
private or public enforcement actions. Without a safe-harbor,
these entities would have a greater burden to prove that the elab-
orated legal rights were not violated. If the implementation
mechanism that is ultimately chosen does not allow sufficient
257. See also Miller, supra note 1, at 1155 (arguing that "an attempt to achieve a
workable balance between privacy and efficiency for any particular application of
computer technology has little promise of success unless proper account is taken of
the great variety of factors and relationships that tend to encourage computerization
system interconnection and data sharing.").
258. See Data Protection Act of 1988, supra note 256, at § 15, reprinted in
NUGTER, supra note 15, at 400.
259. See supra note 67 (discussion of the H.R. 3669 and H.R. 685 legislative
initiatives).
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flexibility, future technological advances may frustrate informa-
tion privacy.
V. CONCLUSION
A host of privacy concerns arise from the commercial
processing of personal information. These concerns relate to the
full range of data processing activities. In the United States to-
day, a narrow and haphazard collection of privacy rights protect
individuals. These rights exist through industry-specific federal
legislation, state common law doctrines and industry-specific
state legislation. The rights do not respond coherently or con-
sistently to data processing privacy concerns. In some contexts,
the aggregation of rights responds clearly to isolated privacy
concerns, yet in other contexts, there will be no available rights.
In light of the proliferation of information technologies and
networks, the United States needs to re-evaluate the legal protec-
tion available to individuals. Some enforceable legal rights ap-
pear necessary and a flexible mechanism to interpret and
implement these rights seems to be critical for the success of
information privacy in the context of rapidly progressing
technologies.

